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The goal of this paper is to examine affective responses to institutionalised narratives on
the genesis, course and consequences of the 1990s conflict in Croatia, which coexist with
subjugated knowledge, usually taking the form of conspiracy theories. The paper is based
on recent fieldwork research. The author examines the ways of forming different personal
narratives dominated by the motifs of home, displacement, (not) belonging, and narratives
close to conspiracy theories which are incorporated into personal accounts. The author sees
conspiracy theories as an attempt to understand the gravity and ambivalence of every (post)
war experience, as a possible loosening of the knot that emerged at the intersection between the
personal and the collective, the cognitive and the emotional, ethnic identity (be it majority or
minority) and citizenship, the desirable and the undesirable, home and leaving home.
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ABOUT THE RESEARCH AND THE RESEARCH 
(OP)POSITION
On several occasions during 2017, with the primary goal of researching
fear narratives and post-war anxiety,1 I conducted fieldwork in a small area
in Lika,2 a region of Croatia with a complex history of conflict and violence.
1 This article has been financed by the Croatian Science Foundation (Narrating Fear: From
Old Records to New Orality, Project No IP-06-2016-2463).
2 Colleague Ivona Grgurinović from the Department of Ethnology and Cultural
Anthropology of the Faculty of Humanities and Social Sciences of the University of
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The fundamental hypothesis, elaborated over time, and the main 
reason for choosing that locality, is the fact that Lika, due to a history 
of conflict and violence (World War II, war of the 1990s), is an anxiety-
filled space. The other premise is that the dominant national and regional 
narratives about Lika dissolve in “small narratives”. In other words, my 
interest is twofold, and it is situated at the intersection of the image of Lika 
as a space of collective anxiety (Gaus 2003:48–59)3 and the complexities 
and contingencies of everyday life.
The idea was to explore the contextual conditioning, polychronic 
time and psychological complexity of each narrative describing horrible, 
traumatic and eerie experiences, with the emphasis on their complex 
reception, response, and the channels of narrative transmission (cf. Bendix 
2000), which is the main goal of the project I am working on, Narrating 
Fear: From Early Records to New Orality. 
Renata Salecl says that the different ages of anxiety in contemporary 
history have come in periods after major social crises, “especially after 
the wars” (Salecl 2004:1). Past wars, as well as all other events important 
for the community, generate fragmentary, contradictory and conflicting 
narratives which seek verbal resolution in every new act of communication, 
evoking ever greater contradictions, fears, a sense of injustice, deprivation, 
incompleteness. Every period of heightened anxiety has a different 
etiology which evokes a characteristic collective response. The complex 
and confusing history of the interlocutors’ (not) belonging is specific 
for the locality in question, as well as important for (this) research. This 
specificity, affected by globalisation and the passing of time, processed 
the local knowledge, the confusing personal experience and the narratives 
about them as part of a bigger picture of power relations, not only national, 
but also global. To study the experience of migration, Sara Ahmed says, 
Zagreb participated in all of the fieldwork, while student colleagues Lorena Drakula, Dinko 
Duančić and Tijana Tadić joined us on one occasion as part of their field course.
3 Helmut Gaus thinks that anxiety is a strictly individual matter. We can talk of collective 
anxiety only when “a large section of the population is threatened by the same disaster” 
(Gaus 2003:48). Collective anxiety implies an awareness of the fact that a group member 
knows that others are anxious as well. It is often preceded by a period of collective fear 
with the same premise.
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does not mean merely to study “how migration challenges identity, but how 
migration can allow identity to become a fetish under the sign of globality” 
(Ahmed 1999:338).4
The research encompasses an area of approximately 30 square 
kilometres, specific in many ways. In order to protect the identity of the 
informants, I will not name the particular microspace,5 especially because 
its precise definition would not contribute significantly to the understanding 
of the text that follows, and it could produce unwanted effects. My intention 
is to explore “small narratives”, individual and personal perspectives on 
the hardships, without an attempt to reconstruct the war events or provide 
an ethnography of a certain space and time with a temporal distance. That 
does not mean that the narrated context and the context of narration are not 
important in examining the phenomenon – on the contrary. The research 
premise is that narration and remembering are intersubjective acts, i.e. a 
practice which does not involve only remembering one’s past experience 
and narrating it, but also remembering for the other (cf. Smith and Watson 
2001:20). I consider memory, remembrance and narration to be not only 
a contextual, but also an intersubjective activity in which many agents, 
individuals, cultural forms, social norms, historical circumstances, effects 
of legal regulation, lived experience, folklore patterns of narrating about 
life, etc., are engaged. Personal narratives are not only personal. They 
are shaped through processes of co-narration (cf. e.g. Borland 2017), co-
cognition and joint remembering or reminiscing (cf. e.g. Fivush et al. 2005).
All of this notwithstanding, I do not think that not writing in detail 
about the context of the narrated events would be irreparably harmful for 
the understanding of the analytical focus and interpretation. I think that 
listing facts about the space and events would hinder the writing process 
and produce more questions than answers in the already conflicting, divided 
society burdened by conspiracies of silence and denial (Zerubavel 2006). 
4 For more on the meaning of space and place in the process of identity formation in the 
context of violence in Croatia, see Povrzanović 1997.
5 Such was the practice of Stef Jansen in his elaboration of the results of his research in the 
same region. He arbitrarily attached colours to places where he did his research in order to 
differentiate between and compare them in his analysis (cf. Jansen 2002, 2006).
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Silence is for Zerubavel a “soft” version of taboo (ibid.:29). He notices that 
everything we ignore as members of society, we also ignore as researchers 
(ibid.:13).
Writing about the controversial aspects and neuralgic spots of one’s 
own society is never entirely comfortable, especially if one wants to 
approach them responsibly and reflectively. Emphasising the researcher’s 
responsibility as early as in the introduction not only sounds unusual, 
but, to a careful reader, also reveals the unease of the author, who cannot 
fully comprehend the historical events connected to the lived experience. 
Emphasising the researcher’s responsibility, apart from reflecting unease, is 
a consequence of the personal conviction and the epistemological decision 
that I cannot (nor do I want to, or know how to) describe the war. As any 
other war, it is a set of diverse experiences initiated and led by different 
agents, affects and circumstances, policies and interests, media strategies 
(on the media narrativisation of the war see Vasiljević 2009), etc.
I see my role as a researcher primarily in recording and interpreting 
fragments of experiences which, for years, had been constantly narratively 
(re)shaped, especially in the genre of personal narratives as defined and used 
in folklore studies (see Bausinger 1958; Stahl 1977a, 1977b; Dégh 1985; 
Braid 1996), or the form known as the narratives of personal experience 
as conceived by Labov and Waletzky (1997) and later used in numerous 
disciplines.6 I do not only deal with these forms, but I try to examine them 
within the entire oral tradition of the community whose members took part in 
the research. Some narratives have been (re)shaped by silence, suppression, 
and aberration of memories that remain as unverbalised anxious residue in 
the background of the total experience of life.
6 Personal experience narratives are everyday performances by “unsophisticated speakers” 
and are seen as “basic narrative structures” (Labov and Waletzky 1997:3), and are also 
designated as the “prototype of narrative activity” (Ochs and Capps 2001:3), i.e. as 
“fundamental narrative structure” (Labov and Waletzky 1997:3). Personal narratives as 
defined by Stahl are narratives with a repetitive pattern (Stahl 1977a:3). On the problems 
of defining the folklore genre of personal narratives see Marković 2010:62–69. For the 
sake of simplicity, I will not distinguish between them here, but will use the common term 
“personal narratives”.
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The intention of the text is by no means to contribute to the explanation 
of the causes, course and consequences of war on the aforementioned area, 
but to contribute to the understanding of the conflict as disintegrating, 
unintelligible, confusing for “common people” and entire communities. 
Such a condition is often irreversible because new narrations which reshape 
the memorised experience cause new (re)integrations, new blind spots, and 
confusing affective interpretations despite the universal human tendency to 
form coherent narratives about one’s own experience and history.
When discussing the war events and everyday life in the researched 
microregion, it is important to note that it is very specific in terms 
of geographic position, traffic (dis)connection, population structure, 
discrepancies between dominant narratives, ideologies and personal 
experience, memories of World War II, the post-war period, etc. I am not 
familiar with specific circumstances that could shape the narratives of fear 
and anxiety in other microlocations in Lika. I am not competent to speak 
about these differences. My intention is not to write an ethnography of war 
and the post-war period in a certain space, but to focus on researching the 
narrative articulation of fear and trauma caused by the experience of war. 
The main goal is to approach the narratives of conflict, displacement 
and return not as a series of historical events in the context of oral history, 
but as an affective response to lived experience, the dominant narrative, as 
well as the gap between them.7 
I will analyse the circulation of emotions and affects not only as the 
triggers of events, but also as powerful triggers and formative agents of 
personal and less personal narratives. In this respect, I will analyse the 
formation of different personal narratives dominated by motifs of home, 
displacement, (not) belonging, and narratives close to conspiracy theories 
which, explicitly or implicitly, as somewhat complete stories or just 
fragments, are incorporated into the aforementioned personal narratives, or 
accompany them as a final formula (coda). Sometimes they do not follow 
each other immediately, but can be causally connected within the interview 
as a whole, as a combination of the cognitive and the affective response 
7 On the difference between personal and official narratives about the war of the 1990s see 
Jambrešić Kirin 1996, 1999.
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to the painful experience of displacement. I see conspiracy theories as 
subjugated knowledge or a form of popular knowledge about the events 
(usp. Birchall 2006) which undoes the knot, in a narrative sense, that 
appears when it is difficult to comprehend the complexity and dissonance 
of the “big narratives” on (not) belonging, the lived experience of (not) 
belonging, and the related affects and emotions.
(NOT) BELONGING: THE INCLUDED, THE INVITED, THE 
(SELF)EXCLUDED
In order to understand the interpretation of the collected narratives, as 
I already mentioned, it is crucial to demonstrate the complex and confusing 
history of the narrators’ (not) belonging: in the period after World War II, 
and before the 1990s conflict, they were equal citizens, and members of 
a constitutive nation; at the beginning and during the conflict, they were 
unwanted citizens of an unwanted nation and religion, (self)excluded 
citizens, wanted residents of the occupied territory, formally invited 
and unwanted citizens at the same time; directly preceding and during 
displacement, they were both invited and (un)wanted foreigners, enemies 
in the ancestral “homeland”, wanted in the new place of residence because 
of their ethnicity, but unwanted based on local identity and origin, welcome 
in some microlocations, unwelcome in others; upon return they had a deep 
sense of belonging to the microlocation, but were still unwanted citizens of 
an unwanted ethnicity and religion. 
What is confusing in the context of (not) belonging could be 
described as the gap between the sensory conception of localness, which 
“intrudes into the senses: it defines what one smells, hears, touches, 
feels, remembers” (Ahmed 1999:341) and Anderson’s (1991) imagining 
communities as well as the related “ethnic engineering” (Štiks 2016:249–
262) and denaturalisation processes (Hayden 1996:793).8
The following examples contain personal narratives dominated by 
motifs of home and (not) belonging, the mindlessness of war and injustice, 
8 For Robert M. Hayden, the denaturalisation process is the transformation of “residents 
who had been equal citizens of federal Yugoslavia into foreigners of their own republics” 
(Hayden 1996:793).
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in which periods before the war intertwine with and are related to the 
wartime period, the period of displacement, as well as the period upon 
return. Dual motifs of home (and when home is far away), as noticed by 
Avtar Brah, can be recognised in the examples. She differentiates between 
home as the place one lives in and home as the place one “comes from”, 
including the category of affect: “Where is home? On the one hand, ‘home’ 
is a mythic place of desire in the diasporic imagination”, in which territory 
is understood as the place of ‘origin’, and on the other, “home is also the 
lived experience of locality, its sounds and smells” (Brah 1996:192).
Example 1:
- Who had the right to kill or poison ten of my dad’s cows, thirteen pigs 
and hundreds of hens, who had the right to do that? The gun wasn’t 
even found. Who is that person? […] And he built all of that [the 
house] with his bare hands. He didn’t get a loan, he didn’t steal from 
anyone. His work earned him all of that. And somebody destroyed it 
overnight. Never again. He has five-six cows, not ten anymore. My 
family keeps up the tradition, everybody works, it’s a modern farm, 
you can get lots of money out of it, cheese, calves, milk. That’s what 
Lika should be like.
Example 2:
- It’s horrible, well, he [the son] made me come back, he said I won’t 
live here [in displacement] anymore and I won’t go to school here. 
He started the first grade of high school and said: “Mom, I won’t go 
to school here anymore”. He didn’t want to speak Ekavian, he didn’t 
want to write in Cyrillic. He is rebellious like that. His class teacher 
called me, she taught the Serbian language, I was already one month 
pregnant. I came to the school and asked: “What did you do?” He 
said: “Nothing, mom.” He was fifth grade then. And I go to her. I 
say: “What did he do?”. “He could have an A in Serbian if he wrote 
in Cyrillic and spoke Ekavian.” “Ma’am, is there a grade between an 
F and an A?” She says: “Yes, a D is between an F and an A.” “Give 
him a D and leave him alone.” He never wanted to write in Cyrillic 
and Ekavian, that’s his revolt. “I won’t be where I don’t want to be.”
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Example 3:
- How was it there for you? [in displacement]
- Terrible. Not bad. Not bad, terrible. […]
- Unbelievable. You are nowhere and you are not a part of anything.
- No, no, that’s not true. I have always been a part of Croatia and I 
always will be. When I came back home after… It was like this. So 
I left in 1995. Three years later, I took a deep breath when I arrived 
in Croatia and I said: “My God, how I missed this air.” You are, you 
belong to where you were born, where you grew up. Wherever that is.
Example 4:
- You arrive there [in displacement]. All of a sudden, you’re a nobody. 
[…] All of a sudden, you arrive there and you are some kind of… 
You’re always, you’re always an immigrant. You always remain on 
the margins of society. It was always difficult to fit in. […] I’ve told 
this story a hundred times. I arrived there as a kid. I was already in 
high school. […] And you fit into the society a little. There were 
many refugees and so on. […] And there was this girl, I mean, it was 
childish love, I don’t know, 18-19 years old, everything is great and 
then she starts working at a radio station. And the story is over. She 
says: “I’m a radio star now, and you’re just a refugee. You’re just a 
refugee.” I mean, I don’t know what… It stuck with me I guess. I will 
remember those words forever, and I’m grateful to her. I don’t know 
where that girl is. I would like to see her and buy her lunch. I don’t 
know what happened to her, I don’t know anything about her, and I 
would like to see her again. […] And when she told me that, I thought 
to myself: I’m going to do something with my life. It doesn’t matter 
that I lost everything, I’m going to do something with my life. Her 
words got to me… Like, all of a sudden, you’re a nobody. […] You’re 
a nobody, you’re a refugee, you’re an alien.
Example 5:
- [the interviewee returns to her house] I say, I don’t need pills. As soon 
as it dawned, I came here and then I… I went in here. No doors to be 
seen, no windows.  But there’s a blanket. The basics are there. They’re 
there. […] There are no doors or windows, but nothing burned down. 
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[…] And he [the husband] told me when I left, he told me: “Go there 
and sell it for what you can get.” He used those words precisely. To 
sell it and to go back? And I called him, I told him to come, to come 
here. I said: “This is where life is.” When I somehow got to my, 
somehow I got to my walls, my house, my… There [in displacement], 
I’m grateful to everyone there, but you’re not attached there, you’re 
not attached. There’s nothing to keep you there. Here you were raised, 
you were born.
The following analysis, I believe, can be applied to a great extent to 
other conflicts and interethnic relations, other wars and other individuals. 
Although personal narratives shape the specific and personal, the narrator can 
borrow themes, symbols, techniques of oral formulation of experience from 
collective narrative heritage, which corresponds to the human need to explain 
one’s own experience, as well as the emotional impulse and emotional response 
to it (cf. Marković 2008:124–125). Different forms of narrating life, personal 
and/or collective experience are socially and culturally conventionalised 
forms through which past experience is organised and represented (cf. Bruner 
2004). Personal narratives with hints of conspiracy theories can be seen as 
spaces where discourses and cultural images can be integrated, disintegrated 
and rejected within different narrative contexts, in alternation and many times 
over (cf. Eakin 1999:371; Marković 2008:127). The goal is to shed light on 
these processes in all of their complexity, contradiction and often elusiveness.
To expose the contingency of everyday life, to shed light on voices 
dispersed on the fringes of legitimised knowledge is in many ways 
dangerous for the stability of “historical truth” as the foundation of a certain 
community’s identity, both for those who “expose” and those who are 
affected by (real or construed) anxiety. 
My interviewees underlined their own awareness of the fact that their 
account is just one of many. They emphasised their being in heteroglossia, 
with a layman’s understanding of the theoretical postulate that a singular 
“historical truth” does not exist anymore, i.e. that its purpose is the 
cultivation of political myth and (national) narratives. For example:
- History is definitely written by winners. You will hear many versions 
of the same event, depending on who is talking and if they’re just 
telling or they participated in it.
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Or:
- If you didn’t listen to my side now, sitting on the other side, you 
would say: impossible, it wasn’t like that. Only when a person 
listens like we listened to the story… I cry over Vukovar every time. 
I cry over it. Somebody does, somebody doesn’t. When you see 
those poor people, those bags, that sorrow, pain and misery… 
They’re going, but where? And then you think of yourself. Vukovar 
made the deepest impression on me. Not to mention that it was 
arranged, that they were sacrificed, put on the hit list, an entire city, 
a human being. But come on… Who would admit that they signed 
it?
Or:
- Screw that, the right to one truth. That’s always dangerous. The right 
to one truth always leads to some form of fascism. Always. Right 
towards it. Yes, if you want to prove the truth, nobody wants to listen. 
And we go back again to the fucking pistol. You listen to the one with 
a bigger pistol.
ETHNOPOLITICS, DISPLACEMENT AND CONSPIRACY 
THEORIES
Narratives with elements of conspiracy theories that penetrate the 
narrative formulation of a person’s own experience of displacement marked 
by fear and trauma can be viewed as an attempt to understand the personal 
experience of conflict as a possible resolution of the quandary arising at 
the intersection of the personal and the collective, the cognitive and the 
emotional, of ethnic (majority and minority) identity and citizenship, 
the wanted and the unwanted, home and abandonment, perpetrator and 
victim. The narratives which we recognise as conspiracy theories, similar 
to legends, rarely constitute a whole narrative, a coherent explanation, and 
are often incorporated in other narrative forms as fragments, allusions, 
associations, etc. They can partly be emancipatory, but also victimising 
narratives.
Almost thirty years have passed since some of the events narrated 
about. From this perspective we cannot know how and when narratives with 
elements of conspiracy theories came to be, and in what contexts they were 
Stud. ethnol. Croat., vol. 30, str. 253–277, Zagreb, 2018.
Jelena Marković: Personal Narrative, Conspiracy Theory and (not) Belonging
263
formed and transformed. What we do know is that today, globally and locally, 
they are an important factor in understanding history from below, and that they 
coexist as popular knowledge on the individual and the collective level, as a 
result of the interference between mass media and oral communication. We 
should consider them temporary. We can assume that the time that has passed 
since the war has shifted the focus of narrative formulation from fear and 
trauma to anxiety and unprocessed (intergenerational) trauma. Conspiracy 
theories, as any other narrative pattern belonging to a community’s oral 
tradition, owe their “continuity” to multiple modifications: dehistorisation, 
transformation from believing to not believing, towards a stage of decline, 
fragmentation, etc. (cf. Bošković-Stulli 1978:42).
To start off the discussion on conspiracy theories and their role in the 
affective and cognitive articulation of experience of return, I will first list 
several examples.
The following example connects motifs of rebellion and war, being 
home and far from home, belonging and not belonging, with elements of 
conspiracy theory:
- That Easter [the beginning of the conflict], on this day, we were all 
in our homes. We had no idea what was going on. All of a sudden, 
there’s people talking about a rebellion. What? Some paramilitaries 
gather. You have no idea about anything. All of a sudden, they accuse 
you: you are all the same. All of whom? All of whom? You never did 
anything against this country, and then you ask: can I come back? I 
can come back. This is my country. It’s the most beautiful country 
in the world. The only country I can love. There’s no other. There’s 
nobody who can give this back to me. I lived in Novi Sad for six years. 
I cried all the time. I want to be here. It’s a difficult life, but this is my 
Lika […]. We’re not all the same. It was always… Like I said. One 
feeds you, another hits you. That’s what 1991 was like. Some lived 
a peaceful life, cutting grass, sowing, ploughing, keeping cattle and 
sheep. Others were like: give me a gun, I want to fight. Fight whom? 
Who actually won over whom? Was it just to tell history one day? 
Who paid for all that? Just to prove whose fault it is. Was it America, 
Germany, was it really Croats and Serbs? Just so they can say: the 
war was fought between this and that. It was a bitter war. A sad one.
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In the second example there are elements of conspiracy theories whose 
function is to explanation the causes of the frightening experience of 
displacement, as a counterpoint to personal narrative.
- He doesn’t like to talk about that because… Again, it’s a matter of 
upbringing, you see. As the difference between the two of them [her 
children] is six years, I thought he was a reasonable kid already. He 
was very happy that he was getting a sister, and since she was born, 
we raised him to appreciate and look after her. At those moments, he 
was trying very hard to look after his little sister, he hugged her all 
the time, held her close. While we were traveling, for example […] 
my son was holding his knees to his chest so that his sister could lie 
down. He doesn’t like to talk about it. He doesn’t. He’s a man now. 
He probably sees it differently than I do as their mother. […] That 
moment wasn’t any of my neighbours’ fault. It’s the fault of some 
bad people who benefited from that. I hope it’s on their conscience.
The function of conspiracy theories in the third example is the narrative 
formulation of fear and the anticipation of historical evil that can arrive at 
any moment and cause new displacement and loss of home. It is also used 
in the broader, global context of peacetime social life and increased (be it 
real, symbolic or digital) violence in the everyday life:
- The only thing I’m afraid of is high politics. That the same scenario 
could be provoked again, not by common people, but by big shots in 
the scene.
- Today, life is such that the fact that someone can barge in and change 
your life has nothing to do with war. We live in an age when threat 
is everywhere. Many things can affect your life, and they can come 
from anywhere. Look at what Facebook does to children. No war can 
do that. Killing themselves.
The fourth example describes conspiratorial national politics that allegedly 
led to the disintegration of multinational communities and displacement.
- D: […] At that time there was more talk about politics maybe, about an 
arrangement so to speak, about treason. […] And then out of nowhere, 
they said move, get your things, leave.
- J: Yes. Get your things, there’s no alternative. Get them and go. 
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[…]
- J: You sleep in sheds, in schools. No fighting. No action.
- D: And all of a sudden, you run. Why run without any resistance? That 
was the order and that was what happened. So…
- Whose order was it?
- J: High politics.
- D: We don’t know whose it was. It’s difficult to know, probably it was 
an agreement between Tuđman and Milošević, that’s where it came 
from. […]
- Actually, high politics did you the most harm?
- J: That’s right.
- D: Correct. Politics. The war in 1941 was a different thing. I mean, 
I know from stories when I was a kid, I remember. It was non-stop 
fighting.
- J: What kind of war was this? You could curl up under a warm blanket. 
Is that war?
- D: There was no war here. That was… People say what they want.
[…]
- J: He would salute and say “I surrender”… That’s the real officer. One 
army wins, the other loses. I surrender this territory to you and that’s 
it. That’s the real thing. Don’t kill. And this was high politics. We were 
supposed to be sent to Kosovo. […]
- D: Right.
- J: To be an obstacle to the Albanians, a shield.
In this example as well:
- M: They pressed for Kosovo.
- G: Yes, we were supposed to go to Kosovo.
- M: You can’t get off the highway, you’re going to Kosovo. That was 
another sign that they made a deal and everything.
The final example shows a more complete narrative about conspiratorial 
forces of power, in which the narrator sees conspiracy as the driving agent 
of history:
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- I believe that there is a plan. It remained unfinished since World War 
II, throughout the post-war [period], until this unfortunate present 
one [war of the 1990s]. But who did that and in what laboratory, so 
to speak, we don’t know, I mean, I don’t know. But I’m certain that 
it was all staged and worked out in detail. Worked out exceptionally. 
And now one literally has to be not blunt, but honest. That’s if you 
want to know how I see it and what I think. How to best explain it…
These examples should be understood with regards to their external 
discursive position. They can be read as conspiracy theories only in relation 
to the dominant discourse, i.e. “official” or “legitimate” knowledge.
Folklorist Suzana Marjanić (2016) compares conspiracy theories 
to the genre of urban legend,9 and finds in them the paranoid matrix Jack 
Bratich described in his Conspiracy Panics: Political Rationality and 
Popular Culture (Bratich 2008). Similar to politologist Nebojša Blanuša 
(2011b), she sees conspiracy theories as the interpretative framework and 
narrative pattern within which political events and processes are explained 
as the consequence of planned, secret work of power centres.10 The crucial 
question Bratich poses is: 
“Is a conspiracy theory defined primarily by its internal narrative 
characteristics or by its external discursive position? In other words, 
is it something inherent in the theory itself or is it more about the 
forums it appears in, its relation to other theories, and the legitimation 
accorded it?” (Bratich 2008:2).
This question was examined on another basis in folklore studies of 
legends and their genre characteristics. In many ways, conspiracy theories 
can be seen as  so-called urban legends (for more on the genre, see Brunvand 
9 For more on urban legends and the controversies related to the genre see Dégh 1977 and 
Brunvand 2003.
10 Marjanić (2016) examines conspiracy theories on the example of the disappearance of 
Malaysia Airlines Flight MH370. The same author has already discussed the subject of 
conspiracy theories in an article published in 2018 (Marjanić 2018), in which conspiracy 
theories are considered as artistic, personal (supra-)interpretations of history.
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2003; Dégh 2001), but also gossip (e.g. Dégh 1977, 2001:126, 131, more on
gossip in general Besnier 2009;11 Birchall 2006).12
If, for this occasion, and very roughly, we examine conspiracy
theories as a narrative pattern in some characteristics related to legend,
it becomes clear then why they rarely appear in oral communication as
complete narratives, and more often as fragments.
I will not delve too deep here into genre characteristics, similarities
and differences between legends, urban legends, gossips, and conspiracy
theories. I will focus on one important common feature of the mentioned
genres which lies at the centre of a large number of conspiracy theory
studies – the one about the veracity of the narrative.
The issue of “veracity” or “falsehood” (primarily in oral transmission)
is crucial for me because, on the analytical level, it could ultimately boil
down to claiming that the “conspiratorial discourse” is false, irrational,
pathological or pathologising (e.g. Hofstadter 2008; Robins and Post 1997),
which is counterproductive for further analysis. In my research, I approach
conspiracy theories differently, relying on Jack Bratich who considers them
a metaconcept signifying the struggles over the meaning of the category
(Bratich 2008:6).13 He clearly opposes authors who think that they are a
“sign of something else (individual mental condition, collective delusional
state of mind, a cultural/political slackening)” (ibid.:14). On the contrary, he
thinks conspiracy theory is a symptom, “but in the reversed perspective […]
a symptom of the discourse that positions it” (ibid.:16). They cannot be seen
as independent of the reality from which they have emerged. On the contrary,
they are “portals into the context that problematises them” (ibid.:19).
An idea is implicit in Bratich’s theory, which we have just outlined,
that was first articulated in folklore studies in the 1970s on a corpus of
11 On the definition of gossip and the problems of defining, see Besnier 2009:19.
12 “Within the remit of gossip, I am thinking not only of the face-to-face practice of speaking 
about an absent third party, e.g. among friends or colleagues, but also the speculations and 
revelations that fill the pages of tabloids and magazines” (Birchall 2006:92).
13 Nebojša Blanuša also analyses them beyond the opposition between delusion and 
concealed truth. He therefore defines conspiracy theories as an interpretation pattern, 
structured as a dual phantasm with the possibility of “severance” (See Blanuša 2011a).
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traditional and contemporary and/or urban legends14 (to which some 
authors add conspiracy theory) and later questioned and developed many 
times over. According to that idea, if the audience did not recognise 
conspiracy theories as at least logical (in our case, even hyperlogical), 
if not entirely true, others would not be able to see them as false and/or 
pathological.15 It works the other way around as well. The level of the 
narrator’s and the audience’s believing or not believing in conspiracy 
theories, i.e. legends and related genres, should in general be approached 
as a fundamental characteristic of the genre – believing in relation to not 
believing and vice versa.
Foklorists Linda Dégh and Andrew Vázsonyi (1976:119) think 
that “objective truth and the presence, quality, and quantity of subjective 
belief are irrelevant” for the exploration and understanding of legends. 
Crucially, legend “takes a stand and calls for the expression of opinion 
on the question of truth and belief” (ibid.). In that sense, I would like to 
stress that an analytical approach to conspiracy theories as a part of a 
community’s oral tradition or popular knowledge (Birchall 2006) does not 
imply the questioning of their veracity or factual accuracy, but should be 
seen as a means of remembering and representation of historical events 
which, although subordinated in value to the so-called official knowledge 
and national narrative, coexist in the individual’s everyday life and rub 
against dominant, authenticated narratives in dependence of which they 
come to existence. The narrator’s and the recipient’s uncertainty in the 
veracity of what is said is characteristic of the genre of oral legend and is 
an “almost obligatory concluding formula which maintains the mystery 
of the narrative” (Marks 2004:20), and is often found in parts of the text 
called the authentication formulae, that directly or indirectly guarantee 
the veracity of the narrative/theory, or express an ambivalence towards it 
(Rudan 2006).
14 The question of what is contemporary in urban legends remains unanswered. The act of 
narrating in the present day makes them contemporary.
15 The question of whether agreements between politicians about the division of territory 
could be called conspiracy theory remains unanswered. They are “historical evidence”, but 
are not a part of official (ethnocentric) narratives, which are closer to myths and legends 
than the memory and understanding of the agents and witnesses of the historical events.
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Relevant for this context is Bratich’s idea that 
“defining conspiracy theories in this legalistic manner is both 
semiotically dissonant and highly selective. Conspiracy theories 
could have this meaning in a neutral marketplace of ideas; they could 
be one kind of descriptive narrative among many. But this is not the 
case. Conspiracy theories exist as a category not just of description 
but of disqualification” (Bratich 2008:3).
Antonio Gramsci warned that “folklore must not be considered an 
eccentricity, an oddity or a picturesque element, but as something which is 
very serious and is to be taken seriously” (Gramsci 2000:362). He thought that 
“certain opinions and scientific notions, removed from their context and more 
or less distorted, constantly fall within the popular domain and are ‘inserted’ 
into the mosaic of tradition” (ibid.:361). In a nutshell, his differentiation 
between two cultures, high and low, is based on power relations, and not on 
quality, credibility, and veracity.16 For him, as well as his entire intellectual 
heritage in folklore studies and numerous other disciplines, including 
Foucault’s ubiquitous legacy,17 the disqualification criticised and questioned 
by Bratich (2008), but also Birchall (2006), is not an analytical option. In her 
study Knowledge Goes Pop: From Conspiracy Theory to Gossip (Birchall 
2006), when examining conspiracy theories, Clare Birchall chooses to focus 
on the knowledge believed in, rather than on those who believe. Birchall also 
sees popular knowledge as “one that moves beyond the truth or falsity of 
statements produced by a particular knowledge” (ibid.:xii). It encompasses 
conspiracy theories, urban legends, gossips, etc. Gramsci’s interpretation is 
not known to some authors who recognised and treated conspiracy theories 
as “social curiosities” that influence the healthy (self)sustainability of a 
society and culture, and who primarily tackled the symptomatology related 
to conspiracy theory (e.g. Showalter 1997; Barkun 2003). Some studies, at 
least in part, almost belong to conspiracy theory discourse.
16 For more on that topic see Marković and Grgurinović 2014.
17 Foucault differentiates between official knowledges and subjugated knowledges. 
Subjugated knowledges “have been disqualified as inadequate to their task or insufficiently 
elaborated: naïve knowledges, located low down on the hierarchy, beneath the required level 
of cognition or scientificity” (Foucault 1980:83). Therefore, they are neither false nor true.
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CONSPIRACY THEORIES AS POLITICS AND HISTORY 
FROM BELOW
Anthropologist Niko Besnier in his book Gossip and the Everyday 
Production of Politics sees anthropological interest (with an emphasis on 
linguistic anthropology) as “an interest in the mundane, the overlooked, 
and the trivial, out of which the anthropologist distils not-so-mundane 
insights into how humans organise life in groups” (Besnier 2009:vx). His 
discussion centres on the question how “intimate events and experiences 
are intertwined with large-scale processes” (ibid.:2). He says that local 
knowledge is transformed under the influence of globalisation in such a way 
that the understanding of the self changes – it is no longer dependent on and 
related to only certain localities, but also to the broader picture of national 
and global power relations. Such an approach places linguistic exchanges (in 
our case, the understanding of that which is said and not said in situations of 
anxiety) in the broad context of power relations and historical processes (cf. 
ibid.:2–3). Linguistic utterances, conversational and narrative genres have 
different social and political effects in specific institutional, ideological and 
historical contexts. Besnier stresses the importance of understanding verbal 
messages and narrative forms as those which 
“are not just embedded in the literal form of what they say or do, 
but in the way in which what they say or do evokes, insinuates, and 
alludes to dynamics that may be quite distant from the immediate 
context” (Besnier 2009:11). 
In order to understand the narrative form of our interlocutors’ 
experiences we do not need to examine decontextualised narrative forms 
(personal narratives, conspiracy theories, oral legends, gossips, etc., anchored 
in a historical context such as World War II, the war of the 1990s), but to 
analyse the ways in which they stand in relation to other oral forms and social 
actions, taking into account the complex context of narrating about a distant, 
emotionally charged experience, the passing of time, and the society in which 
they are marginalised, often demonised, and ungrievable (Butler 2009), etc.
Consistent with Besnier’s understanding of gossip, conspiracy theories 
can, as a related genre, be understood as “politics ‘from below’, particularly 
from the perspective of those whose voice is rarely heard in public or from 
Stud. ethnol. Croat., vol. 30, str. 253–277, Zagreb, 2018.
Jelena Marković: Personal Narrative, Conspiracy Theory and (not) Belonging
271
perspectives that are deemed ‘not to matter’” (Besnier 2009:12). Similarly, 
Jack Bratich sees conspiracy theories as “defined not merely by their strictly 
denotative, inherent properties, but by their discursive position in relation 
to a ‘regime of truth’” (Bratich 2008:3), whereby conspiracy theories are, at 
the same time, a type of narrative and “a sign of narrative disqualification” 
(ibid.:4). In her definition of popular knowledges (in which she includes 
conspiracy theories), Birchall says that politically, “they might question or 
support dominant ideological modes” and that 
“they offer understandings of the world not bounded by (although 
certainly in various kinds of relation with) ‘official’, legitimated 
knowledge. In addition, these popular knowledges are often 
produced outside of […] the ‘official’ sites of knowledge production 
– the university, government, the law” (Birchall 2006:22).
Our goal as researchers, I repeat, is not to support or contest the 
coexistence of competitive “regimes of truth”. Besides, conspiracy 
theories and related forms are not just subjugated knowledge. They 
should also be seen as emancipatory narratives which do not necessarily 
designate their protagonists as victims of historical events and processes. 
They resolve fear or de/remistify the object of past fear and heal present 
residues of anxiety, they soothe (but do not nullify) the feeling of guilt, 
they explain unintelligible past events. In contrast, these narratives have 
a (de)stabilising effect on the rival group or groups, who perceive oral 
narratives as conspiracy theories. They emerge from distrust and provoke 
distrust at the same time. “[C]onspiracy theory is itself a practice based 
upon the distrust of official histories even if it does not question the basic 
linear premise of historical narratives” (Birchall 2006:35), as is evident 
from our examples.
Sara Ahmed says that emotions “circulate between bodies”, “they 
‘stick’ as well as move” (Ahmed 2014:4), they “are both about objects, 
which they hence shape, and are also shaped by contact with objects” 
(ibid.:7). The struggle for the right to be proud, to belong or not belong, to 
have a future, to articulate fear, shame, anxiety, regret, is thus continued 
through each new communication about historical events and personal 
experience immersed in them. Conspiracy theories can thus be seen as 
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discourse emerging from fear, silence, insecurity, and anxiety, as well as 
evoking the very same feelings in return, not necessarily in that order.
In legend, fear is present on all levels of the genre, since it is a genre of 
oral literature which formulates, processes, codifies, keeps and “recycles” 
the fears of the community. Conspiracy theories are also related to the 
feelings of fear and insecurity, as well as periods of social crises causing 
great and quick social changes, which “call existing power structures, 
norms of conduct, or even the existence of specific people or groups into 
question” (Van Prooijen and Douglas 2017:324). Social crises, which 
war certainly is, contribute to the formulation of conspiracy theories “and 
may form the basis for how people subsequently remember and mentally 
represent a historical event” (ibid.:323). Some events more than others 
seek the explanation for their causes. In that context, there is a relevant 
study in the field of social psychology (Bruckmüller et al. 2017:270). With 
attribution theory as a starting point, it poses the question: what is it that 
begs explanation of past events with “common people” or “lay historians” 
(cf. Klein 2013)? They reach the ironic conclusion that “if we want to find 
out what begs explanation in history, we need to realise how history itself 
shapes what begs explanation” (Bruckmüller et al. 2017:270). Let us call to 
mind Bratich’s identical idea we mentioned before, of conspiracy theories 
as the portal into the context that problematises them (Bratich 2008:19).
In conclusion, I see my research as part of the aforementioned complex 
emotional, cognitive and narrative space of struggle for knowledge of 
events. We are never excluded from it, from fieldwork to the text and back. 
In the struggle for the right to the narrative as well as scholarly analysis 
between “the competing accounts for any event, the official version is 
not merely the winner in a game of truth — it determines who the players 
can be” (ibid.:7). Just as our interlocutors’ narratives, this work is theory 
formulation, creation of knowledge emerging from our insecurity, fear 
and anxiety, as well as our ethical responsibility to question and subvert 
simplified (militant) official narratives about war.
Hopefully, this work will be an addition to the understanding of 
minority, subjugated and popular knowledge expressed in the form of 
personal narratives with fragments of conspiracy theories that can be read 
only in relation to their external discursive position. The intention was not 
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to produce knowledge about concrete war events, but to examine, primarily 
from the perspective of folklore studies, the ways in which frightening and 
traumatic experience of displacement and (not) belonging can subsequently 
be formulated.
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OSOBNA PRIPOVIJEST, TEORIJE ZAVJERE I (NE)PRIPADANJE: ISKUSTVA 
RATA, IZMJEŠTANJA I OTUĐENJA
Na osnovi etnografskoga terenskog istraživanja na području Hrvatske cilj je istražiti 
afektivne odgovore na institucionalizirane narative o genezi, tijeku i posljedicama sukoba 
1990-ih godina u Hrvatskoj koji supostoje s podčinjenim, popularnim znanjima najčešće 
oblikovanim u obliku teorija zavjere. Autorica promatra načine oblikovanja različitih 
osobnih pripovijesti u kojima dominiraju motivi doma, izbjeglištva, (ne)pripadnosti te 
pripovijesti bliskih teorijama zavjere koje se upisuju u osobne pripovijesti. Teorije zavjere 
autorica promatra kao pokušaj razumijevanja težine i ambivalentnosti svakoga (po)ratnog 
iskustva, kao moguće razrješenje čvora nastalog na sjecištu osobnoga i kolektivnoga, 
kognitivnoga i emocionalnoga, etničkoga (većinskog, manjinskog) i građanskoga, 
poželjnoga i nepoželjnoga, doma i njegova napuštanja. 
Ključne riječi: osobne pripovijesti, teorije zavjera, strah, anksioznost, raseljavanje, 
(ne)pripadanje, podčinjeno znanje, popularno znanje
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